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Explicit information reduces discounting behavior in monkeys
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Animals are notoriously impulsive in common laboratory experiments, preferring smaller, sooner 
rewards to larger, delayed rewards even when this reduces average reward rates. By contrast, 
the same animals often engage in natural behaviors that require extreme patience, such as 
food caching, stalking prey, and traveling long distances to high-quality food sites. One possible 
explanation for this discrepancy is that standard laboratory delay discounting tasks artificially 
inflate impulsivity by subverting animals’ common learning strategies. To test this idea, we 
examined choices made by rhesus macaques in two variants of a standard delay discounting 
task. In the conventional variant, post-reward delays were uncued and adjusted to render total 
trial length constant; in the second, all delays were cued explicitly. We found that measured 
discounting was significantly reduced in the cued task, with discount parameters well below 
those reported in studies using the standard uncued design. When monkeys had complete 
information, their decisions were more consistent with a strategy of reward rate maximization. 
These results indicate that monkeys, and perhaps other animals, are more patient than is normally 
assumed, and that laboratory measures of delay discounting may overstate impulsivity.
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 long-term ( undiscounted) reward rates (Stephens and Krebs, 1986), 
defined as the sum of total rewards divided by total foraging time. 
Nevertheless, rational models of foraging have been hard-pressed 
to explain the high discount rates observed in laboratory experi-
ments, in which choice behavior by rats and pigeons would imply 
that delayed rewards may lose half their value in a matter of seconds. 
Though it has been argued that animals should prefer immedi-
ate rewards when energy budgets are negative or collection risk is 
high (Caraco et al., 1980; Mcnamara and Houston, 1992; Kacelnik 
and Bateson, 1996; Hayden and Platt, 2007), observed discounting 
rates remain difficult to explain by appeal to naturally occurring 
risk (Stevens and Stephens, 2010). Likewise, discount rates meas-
ured in the laboratory would appear to preclude activities like food 
caching and prey selection, which require valuing future rewards 
above immediate rewards. In fact, more recent work has questioned 
whether the reward rate currency calculated by animals is, in fact, 
long-term reward or some approximation (Bateson and Kacelnik, 
1995, 1996), as well as whether decision rules that appear impulsive 
in the laboratory might come close to maximizing reward in the 
wild (Stephens and Anderson, 2001; Stephens and McLinn, 2003; 
Stephens et al., 2004).
These discrepancies between discount rates measured in the 
laboratory and the patience often observed in natural foraging 
behavior raises fundamental questions about the ecological valid-
ity of these common laboratory tasks (Stephens and Anderson, 
2001). In typical inter-temporal choice tasks, animals are pre-
sented with a series of choices between rewards differing in both 
quantity and delay. In some studies, either the delay to or the 
amount of the larger reward is titrated until both options are 
equally preferred (Brunner and Gibbon, 1995; Richards et al., 1997; 
Cardinal et al., 2001; Green and Myerson, 2004; Green et al., 2004, 
2007; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008). In others, a whole series of 
IntroductIon
The tradeoff between immediate and delayed gratification is a 
fundamental dilemma confronting both humans and animals, 
with important consequences for biological fitness, establishment 
of wealth, and psychiatric disease (Rachlin, 2000; Frederick et al., 
2002). Almost 40 years of research has established that animals, 
when presented with a choice between smaller rewards delivered 
sooner (SS) and longer rewards delivered later (LL), typically prefer 
the smaller, sooner reward in a manner inconsistent with long-
term reward rate maximization (Ainslie, 1974; Mazur, 1984, 1987; 
Rachlin, 2000; Shapiro et al., 2008). Such preferences are therefore 
costly, potentially undervaluing future incomes and leading to 
suboptimal foraging. This bias is observed in humans as well, and 
is often attributed to failures of self-control (Rachlin and Green, 
1972; Ainslie, 1974).
In humans and other animals, inter-temporal preferences are 
generally explained by positing that the present subjective val-
ues of future rewards are discounted by the delay to receipt of 
reward (Mazur, 1984; Grossbard and Mazur, 1986; Shapiro et al., 
2008). This pattern of discounting is generally assumed to reflect a 
hyperbolically diminishing utility for future rewards, although the 
relationship may be exponential or quasi-hyperbolic (Loewenstein 
and Prelec, 1992; McClure et al., 2004). According to such models, 
the shape and steepness of the discount curve may reflect risk-
aversion (Henly et al., 2008) or uncertainty about delays (Brunner 
et al., 1994, 1997; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1995), and can be esti-
mated from the pattern of revealed preferences in inter-temporal 
choice tasks.
However, these economically inspired models stand in stark 
contrast to those derived from analyses of animal foraging 
behavior. Foraging theorists have long argued that evolution-
ary processes should drive animals to act in ways that maximize 
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 explicitly cued. Consistent with our predictions, we found that 
cuing post-reward delays dramatically reduces observed tem-
poral discounting.
MaterIals and Methods
subject anIMals
Two adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) served as sub-
jects. All procedures were approved by the Duke University Medical 
Center Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee and complied 
with Public Health Services Guide for the Care and Use of Animals. 
To prepare animals for electrophysiological recording in separate 
experiments, a small prosthesis and a stainless steel recording cham-
ber were attached to the calvarium. Animals were habituated to 
training conditions and trained to perform oculomotor tasks for 
liquid reward. Animals received analgesics and antibiotics after all 
surgeries. The chamber was kept sterile with antibiotic washes and 
sealed with sterile caps.
behavIoral technIques
Eye position was sampled at 1000 Hz (Eyelink, SR Research). 
Experiments were controlled and data were recorded by a computer 
running Matlab (The Mathworks) with Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 
1997) and Eyelink (Cornelissen et al., 2002). Visual stimuli were 
squares or rectangles (8° wide) on a computer monitor 50 cm in 
front of the monkeys’ eyes.
Monkeys’ performed three variants of a visually cued inter-
temporal choice task (Figure 1). On each trial, they fixated a cen-
tral cue, following which two choice targets appeared onscreen. 
A solenoid valve controlled juice delivery. Juice volumes were 
linear in solenoid open time, and we have previously shown that 
monkeys discriminate juice volumes as small as 20 μL (McCoy 
et al., 2003). Juice flavor was the same for all rewards. To motivate 
performance, access to fluid was controlled outside of experimen-
tal sessions; monkeys earned roughly 80% of total daily ration 
by performance.
choices involving many pairs of rewards and delays is presented, 
and discount curves are constructed from preferences (Kim et al., 
2008; Shapiro et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2009; Louie and Glimcher, 
2010). However, this latter design admits a potential loophole: if, 
for instance, choosing shorter delays allows an animal to collect 
more rewards in the allotted experimental time, preference for 
the smaller, sooner (SS) option may be ascribed not to irrational 
impulsivity or discounting, but to rational maximization of reward 
rates (Stephens and Krebs, 1986). To compensate, experimenters 
typically introduce either inter-trial intervals much longer than 
delays to reward or an adjusting post-reward delay that renders 
total trial length constant. In the former case, observed discounting 
behavior contradicts field experiments on prey selection, where 
larger rewards are strongly preferred when handling times are 
small in comparison with encounter rates (Stephens and Krebs, 
1986). In the latter case, an animal attempting to maximize long-
term gain must learn an unnatural temporal contingency – one 
in which long post-reward delays follow short pre-reward delays, 
and vice versa. Such a rule might prove tremendously difficult to 
learn. In fact, empirical data show that rats and pigeons are often 
insensitive to manipulations of post-reward delay (Logue et al., 
1985; Goldshmidt et al., 1998).
In this paper, we tested the hypothesis that insensitivity to 
post-reward delays might account for much of the discount-
ing behavior observed in laboratory studies using standard 
inter-temporal choice tasks. If the learning rules animals use to 
map cues to outcomes fail to make use of implicit information 
about post-reward delays, choice behavior may fail to maximize 
long-term reward rate, and discounting rates inferred from this 
behavior will be high. If so, then providing explicit cues to post-
reward delays in a standard inter-temporal choice task should 
substantially reduce discounting for identical pairs of rewards 
and delays. We tested these predictions by comparing discount 
parameters of two monkeys performing identical inter- temporal 
choice tasks when post-reward delays were either uncued or 
Cue Onset Cue Selection Pre-reward Delay Reward Delivery Post-reward Delay
Fixation
A
B
Figure 1 | Task design for the uncued (A) and cued (B) variants of the 
inter-temporal choice task. In the cued version of the task, pairs of targets 
appeared after a brief fixation period. In a third variant, monkeys had to 
maintain fixation to shrink the bar. Lengths of vertical bars represented delays 
to reward, colored stripes differing juice volumes. Monkeys were required to 
briefly hold fixation on the target of their choice (0.5 s), after which the 
unselected cue vanished and the bar corresponding to the chosen option 
shrank at a fixed rate. Reward was delivered when the top of the bar reached 
the colored stripe. In the uncued paradigm, the screen remained blank 
through the post-reward delay. In the cued paradigm, the remaining bar 
corresponded to the post-reward delay and continued to shrink through the 
end of the trial.
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subjects from day to day and with other published studies (see 
Results). Following the introduction of cued variants, monkeys 
performed multiple sessions (n = 5, Monkey E; n = 7, Monkey O) 
in which cued and uncued variants of the task were interleaved 
in blocks of approximately 200 trials. Following this, we collected 
data exclusively under the cued variants (n = 5, Monkey E; n = 9, 
Monkey O), followed by brief challenge sessions (n = 2, Monkey 
E; n = 6, Monkey O) under the uncued variant.
controls
We began each session (n = 54) with 50 trials each of three different 
control tasks. In the first, pre- and post-reward delays were equated, 
and monkeys were required to discriminate reward color cues. In 
the second and third, reward cues were equated, and monkeys were 
required to discriminate either the pre- or post-reward delay (with 
the other interval held constant). Performance was better than 90% 
in all three control tasks. Monkeys were easily able to visually dis-
criminate even small differences in bar length, equivalent to 0.5 s 
(20 pixel) differences in >10 s total wait times. This is substantially 
better than natural interval timing behavior, demonstrating that 
monkeys must have made use of the bar stimuli to inform their 
choices (Gibbon et al., 1984, 1988; Janssen and Shadlen, 2005).
data analysIs
We calculated reward rates as ratios of expectations
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with T the total trial time. We fit choice preferences by assuming a 
standard hyperbolic discounting curve (Mazur, 1984),
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where r′ is the present discounted value of the future reward r, D is 
the delay to reward, and k , which has units of time−1, is the discount 
parameter (we exclusively use seconds as our unit of time). We 
further assumed that the probability of choosing the option with 
larger r′ was given by a logistic function of the difference in the two 
discounted values (Kim et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2009; Louie and 
Glimcher, 2010). Behavioral parameters were fit by custom scripts 
written using the Matlab Optimization Toolbox (The Mathworks). 
Hypothesis tests for differences of discount parameters and confi-
dence intervals were calculated by bootstrap resampling (N = 1000) 
of the dataset with replacement. Parameters were considered sig-
nificantly different if both lay outside the 95% bootstrap confidence 
interval for the other. In addition, we compared and fit a number 
of alternative discounting hypotheses, including exponential and 
pure reward rate models, using an Akaike Information Criterion 
approach (see below).
Models and Model FIttIng
We fit animals’ choices across all days for each task variant using a 
maximum log likelihood procedure. Numerical fits were performed 
via custom scripts utilizing the Matlab Optimization Toolbox. For 
each of our 13 models, we paired a value function (used to assign a 
number to each option) with a choice function that determined the 
basIc task desIgn
In all versions of the task, each choice option (target) consisted of 
a gray bar overlaid with a thin colored stripe, corresponding to an 
amount of liquid reward (Figure 1). Colors were chosen from five 
values, corresponding to 120 ms (red), 160 ms (yellow), 200 ms 
(green), 240 ms (blue), and 320 ms (white) of solenoid open time 
(150–400 μL). On each trial, two contiguous juice rewards were 
randomly selected. Likewise, in all versions, pre-reward delays var-
ied from 0.5 to 6 s in 0.5 s intervals. In some sessions, the SS delay 
was restricted to be <2 s, while the LL delay was >3 s. Post-reward 
delays were chosen such that the sum of pre- and post-reward 
delays totaled either 5.25 or 6.5 s. Both this restriction, along with 
the stipulation of adjacent reward values, served to maximize the 
number of difficult decisions animals faced, thereby increasing 
precision in estimating the choice function.
The length of the bar from its top to the stripe indicated the 
delay to reward, and the length of the bar beneath the stripe indi-
cated post-reward delay. To prevent the animals from using the 
absolute vertical position of the stripe as a cue, the gray bars them-
selves were randomly positioned along the vertical axis. After the 
cues appeared, the monkeys were free to look between targets, and 
made selections by briefly holding fixation on the target of their 
choice (0.5–0.75 s). After the decision was made, the unselected 
option immediately disappeared, and the gray bar indicating delay 
to reward began to shrink at a constant rate (40 pixels/s), from the 
top toward the bottom of the screen. When the top of the gray bar 
reached the colored stripe, the monkey received a liquid reward. 
In the cued variant (see below), the bar continued to shrink; in 
the standard variant, the screen went blank. After the cue disap-
peared, the animal waited through the post-reward delay for the 
next trial to begin.
task varIants
Monkeys performed three variants of the choice task. In the standard 
variant, delay to reward was indicated, but the post-reward delay 
remained uncued. The second version was identical to the first, except 
the post-reward delay was also cued, and the gray bar continued to 
shrink after reward delivery and through the post-reward delay. To 
test the hypothesis that effort costs might render the post-reward 
delay more salient, further reducing discounting, we implemented 
a third version of the task, in which pre- and post-reward delays 
were once again cued, but monkeys were required to hold fixation 
on the shrinking target for the duration of both the pre- and post-
reward delays. Whenever the monkeys broke fixation, the bar ceased 
to shrink. However, trials did not end until monkeys accumulated a 
total fixation time equal to the indicated delay. (This did not appreci-
ably alter the delay contingency: monkeys were able to hold unbroken 
fixation for total wait times of more than 6 s, and fewer than 10% 
of fixation holds took longer than 10% of their nominal wait time 
to complete.) If the effort required to hold fixation during the delay 
interval altered monkeys’ perception of delay intervals or reward 
rates, this should have resulted in altered choice behavior.
Pre-traInIng and sessIon structure
We began by training each animal exclusively on the uncued con-
dition, introducing cued variants only after learning had clearly 
stabilized, with observed discount parameters consistent within 
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Finally, for models in which the value of a given option decreased 
in time, we defined a cross-model measure of discounting as follows: 
using the fact that our total trial length, T, was a constant (T = D + τ), 
we defined the half-life, γ, as that value of D at which the discounted 
value of a given option was decreased to half its value at D = 0. 
Because this parameter could be defined across 9 of our 13 models, 
it could be calculated independently of which model gave the best fit 
to behavioral data. Moreover, it allowed us to appropriately average 
a measure of choice behavior across all models (see below).
results
Both monkeys proved highly adept at the task. In the uncued condi-
tion, monkeys earned 89 and 92% of available reward, increasing 
to 96 and 93% in the fully cued condition. Since total trial times 
were held constant, any choice of the SS option necessarily resulted 
in a reduced reward rate. However, monkeys chose the LL option 
more frequently when post-reward delays were cued, even though 
delays were, on average, longer in the cued conditions (Table 1). 
Percentages of LL choices were uncorrelated with variations in total 
wait times across conditions (R = 0.18, p = 0.74, Pearson correlation; 
F
1,3
 = 0.12, p = 0.76 main effect of total wait time, two-way ANOVA 
with subject and wait time as factors), suggesting that the observed 
effects were indeed related to the cuing paradigm and not the menus 
of options presented. Moreover, analysis of a subset of trials with 
fixed total trial time yielded the same result (Figure 3).
Discounting parameters for the three paradigms are shown in 
Figure 2. Behavior, pooled across all days, was fit to standard hyper-
bolic discounting models using a maximum likelihood procedure 
probability of choosing each option based on these values. Models 
are detailed in Table 2 below. Choice functions were either Bernoulli 
(a fixed probability, p, of choosing the best option) or logistic, with 
probability of choosing the higher-valued (not necessarily larger 
reward) option given by
 
p( ) ( )hv
e
=
+
− −
α
δ µ
σ1  
(3)
with α, μ, and σ fit to the data and δ the relevant decision variable 
listed in Table 2.
We compared models using Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AIC), an information-theoretic goodness-of-fit measure that 
compensates for varying numbers of parameters. This quantity, 
defined as
 AIC LL k≡ − +2 2 ,  (4)
where LL is the log likelihood of data given the best-fit (maximum 
likelihood) parameters and k is the number of parameters fit. Lower 
AIC values represent better fits to the data. For comparisons among 
models, we made use of the so-called “Akaike weight,” defined by
 w ei
i=
−1
2
∆
,  (5)
with ∆
i
 ≡ AIC
i
 − AIC
min
 the relative AIC measure. Note that, by 
definition, ∑ =i iw 1, and the w’s offer only a relative goodness-of-
fit within the class of models considered.
Table 1 | Percentage of LL choices, average trial lengths, and earned and maximum reward rates as a function of task condition.
Task Subject % LL choices err (μL/s) Mrr (μL/s) Avg trial length (s) % rwd earned
Uncued E 0.520 ± 0.009 36.6 ± 0.1 41.3 ± 0.9 6.05 ± 0.01 0.887 ± 0.006
 O 0.500 ± 0.007 36.9 ± 0.8 41.3 ± 0.8 6.17 ± 0.01 0.894 ± 0.004
Cued E 0.661 ± 0.009 43.0 ± 1.0 46.5 ± 0.9 5.22 ± 0.02 0.925 ± 0.005
 O 0.714 ± 0.011 40.5 ± 1.4 43.3 ± 1.2 5.85 ± 0.04 0.935 ± 0.006
Cued, E 0.810 ± 0.006 37.9 ± 1.0 39.5 ± 0.9 6.50 ± 0.00 0.960 ± 0.003
Fixated O 0.704 ± 0.011 39.6 ± 1.6 42.4 ± 1.4 6.20 ± 0.01 0.934 ± 0.006
Error measures are ±SEM. ERR, earned reward rate; MRR, maximum reward rate.
Monkey E Monkey O0
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Figure 2 | Discounting rates decrease with explicit information about 
post-reward delay. Discount parameters were estimated by a maximum 
likelihood analysis of a hyperbolic model (see Materials and Methods). Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrap analysis. 
(A) Estimated discount parameter values were significantly lower for both of the 
two paradigms in which post-reward delays were cued, though not significantly 
different from one another. (B) Model-averaged effective half-lives were 
significantly increased in both explicit cuing paradigms.
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respectively; p < 0.05, bootstrap randomization test; see Materials 
and Methods). Estimates of discounting parameter were also sig-
nificantly different between the two cued variants (p < 0.05, boot-
strap randomization test), though with different results in each 
subject. In both cases, however, cued-variant discount parameters, 
corresponding to reward half-lives of around 10–20 s, represent up 
to a full order of magnitude decrease in discounting.
In addition, to account for the possibility that hyperbolic dis-
counting may not best capture choice behavior, we fit choices to a 
total of 13 separate models, a mixture of undiscounted, exponential, 
and hyperbolic models making use of distinct choice rules and 
including post-reward intervals (Table 2). For both monkeys across 
all conditions, we found that hyperbolic-form models produced 
better fits in all cases, most often by taking into account the (under-
weighted) post-reward delay (Table 3). Furthermore, to account for 
variability in model fits between monkeys and across conditions, we 
calculated an effective discounting half-life for 9 of the 13 models, 
defined as the time over which the estimated subjective value of 
an option was reduced by half. This allowed us to calculate a fit-
weighted average of half-life across models, a model-independent 
measure of discounting (Table 4). As seen in Figure 2B, these cal-
culated half-lives were again significantly different between cued 
and uncued conditions for both monkeys (p < 0.05, bootstrap ran-
domization test), confirming that the observed effect was not an 
artifact of the particular model chosen.
Finally, to investigate the potential effect of cue-type ordering 
on monkeys’ patterns of choice behavior, we calculated separate 
half-lives for the interleaved, cued-only, and uncued-only phases 
of testing. Interestingly, interleaved cuing sessions failed to pro-
duce distinct discounting behavior in either monkey, though the 
switch to exclusively cued sessions resulted in a dramatic drop in 
discounting, an effect reversed by the return to uncued-only test-
ing (Figure 4). This implies that the observed drop in discounting 
cannot merely be a function of either total task experience or the 
(see Materials and Methods). In the uncued task, the two monkeys’ 
discount parameters were k = 0.48 and 0.22 s–1, respectively, equiva-
lent to a reward half-life on the order of 2–5 s (Table 4). These values 
are comparable to those measured for rhesus monkeys in similar 
choice paradigms (Kim et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2009; Louie and 
Glimcher, 2010), in which preferences were allowed to stabilize over 
many thousands of trials. Thus differences with the cued condition 
are unlikely to be the result of continued learning. Nevertheless, we 
observed significantly lower discount parameters when post-reward 
delays were cued (k = 0.11 and 0.04 s–1, cued and cued-fixated, 
0
20
40
60
Monkey E Monkey O
ha
lf-
lif
e 
(s) *
*
Task
Uncued
Cued, combined
Figure 3 | Model-averaged half-lives for both monkeys, calculated using 
only trials with total length 6.5 s. Cued, combined refers to data pooled 
across the two cued conditions for each subject. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals for the means, calculated by bootstrap resampling.
Table 2 | Model specifications for the 13 models used.
Number Discounting Value (v) Decision variable Choice function Parameters Half-life (γ)
 1 – r max{r, r ′} Bernoulli 1 –
 2 – r r − r ′ Logistic 3 –
 3 Hyperbolic r/(1 + kD) v − v ′ Logistic 4 1/k
 4 Hyperbolic r/(1 + k(D + κτ)) v − v ′ Logistic 5 (1 + k*κT )/(k(1 − κ))
 5 Hyperbolic r/(1 + k(D + κτ−1)) v − v ′ Logistic 5 (1 + k*κT )/(k(1 − κ))*
 6 Exponential re−kD v − v ′ Logistic 4 log 2/k
 7 Exponential re−k(D + κτ) v − v ′ Logistic 5 log 2/(k(1 − κ))
 8 Marginal gain – r − r ′/(D − D) Logistic 3 –
 9 – r r/r ′ Logistic 3 –
10 Reward rate r/D† v/v ′ Logistic 3 2
11 Hyperbolic r/(1 + kD) v/v ′ Logistic 4 1/k
12 Hyperbolic r/(1 + k(D + κτ)) v/v ′ Logistic 5 (1 + k*κT )/(k(1 − κ))
13 Hyperbolic r/(D + κτ)† v/v ′ Logistic 4 κT/(1 − κ)
*Strictly speaking, this formula is only valid on average, since we have D + τ = T every trial, but D + τ −1 = T only on average.
†Because of differences in the way in which the separate decision variables (v − v ′ vs v/v ′) enter the logistic choice function, Models 3 and 4 also include within 
themselves equivalents of these two models, in which there is no constant in the denominator. In addition, Model 12 is clearly equivalent to Model 13 in the limit 
of large k.
Variables used: r, reward; D, delay to reward; τ, post-reward delay; τ−1, post-reward delay (previous trial); T, total trial length (T = D + τ). k and κ are fit to the data.
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Table 3 | Akaike weights for each of the 13 fitted models and task conditions.
Task Subject
 Model weight (w)
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Uncued E 0 0 0.0156 0.0056 0.0049 0 0 0 0 0 0.0677 0.9058 0.0003
 O 0 0 0.5725 0.2106 0.2113 0 0 0 0 0 0.0023 0.0009 0.0023
Cued E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2510 0.7490
 O 0 0 0.0010 0.0004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6117 0.2897 0.0968
Cued, E 0 0 0.0306 0.0112 0.0111 0.0002 0 0 0 0 0.7019 0.2449 0
Fixated O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0323 0.2535 0.7142
Values less than 10−4 are recorded as 0.
Table 4 | Half-lives and confidence intervals across task conditions.
Task
 Monkey e Monkey O
 Half-life 95%  Half-life 95%  
 (γ) Confidence (γ) Confidence
Uncued 1.71 [1.53, 2.07] 5.68 [3.71, 7.46]
Cued 6.93 [4.92, 9.61] 10.44 [7.21, 14.41]
Cued,  8.45 [2.24, 10.56] 21.61 [14.75, 38.57] 
Fixated
Half-lives are averaged across models, weighted by Akaike weights. Confidence 
intervals are determined by bootstrap resampling of the data for each task 
condition.
presence of added information on a single trial, but rather that the 
larger mixture of options available during a given testing session, 
along with learning effects across sessions, plays a crucial role.
dIscussIon
We report that explicit cuing of post-reward delays reduced meas-
ured discounting parameters in rhesus monkeys by up to a full order 
of magnitude. Several factors might explain this apparent reduction 
in measured discounting behavior. First, the explicit post-reward 
cue might have rendered the post-reward delay more salient, thus 
enhancing animals ability to attribute post-consummatory delays 
to the prior choices. This would suggest that at least some portion 
of preference for the SS option is explained by an intrinsic difficulty 
with the task structure, an obstacle mitigated by explicit cuing. 
Again, this retrograde attribution failure may prove unimportant 
in typical foraging scenarios, in which delays are rarely imposed 
following consummatory behavior. A second possible explanation 
for the difference in discounting is that explicit cuing of post-
reward delays alters the subjective perception of time. However, 
our data show no correlation between mean trial duration and 
discounting behavior, as would be expected if cuing had simply 
recalibrated monkeys rate of subjective passage of time (Gibbon 
et al., 1984, 1988; Staddon and Higa, 1999; Zentall, 1999; Buhusi 
and Meck, 2005). A third possibility is that we increased the cog-
nitive demands of the task significantly by randomly presenting 
many choices between distinct reward-delay pairs rather than the 
same choice multiple times in succession in a blocked format. In 
response, the animals might have adopted a simple pick-the-best 
heuristic that based preferences solely on reward for all but the 
shortest delays (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). If this were the case, 
we would predict greater discounting when the same choices were 
blocked and offered repeatedly.
Yet none of these potential explanations contradicts the conclu-
sion that observed discounting behavior does not derive primarily 
from intrinsic individual- and species-specific impulsivity. This 
idea is supported by the finding that in another common task 
design – the titrated choice paradigm – implemented in monkeys’ 
home cages, macaques showed a similar reduction in discounting 
(Tobin et al., 1996). Notably, the estimated discount parameters in 
that study were near the lowest measurable given the constraints 
of the experiment. Similarly, when choosing between immediate 
and delayed doses of cocaine, macaques were also very patient 
(Woolverton et al., 2007), though in this case, reward maximiza-
tion may have appeared more salient, since monkeys were limited 
to only eight choice trials per day. In fact, after extensive training, 
one of the monkeys in a similar study exhibited a very low rate of 
discounting, with a half-life more than twice the length of the long-
est delay studied (Louie and Glimcher, 2010). Thus, while neither 
our findings nor these others suggest that all impulsivity results 
from informational and attributional limitations, they do suggest 
that such intrinsic impulsivity may be significantly less than has 
been assumed.
Our findings challenge many current ideas about temporal 
discounting. The fundamental lability of inter-temporal prefer-
ences indicates that discount parameters are highly sensitive to 
slight variations in task. Consistent with this notion, studies with 
humans typically estimate discounting rates for money on the 
order of weeks or months (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; McClure 
et al., 2004; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 
2008), but tasks that involve many decisions with delays on the 
order of seconds often estimate much higher rates of discount-
ing (Schweighofer et al., 2006; Luhmann et al., 2008; Carter et al., 
2010). This contradiction challenges the idea that any given set of 
discount parameters reflects a measure of true discounted utility, 
rather than specific details of the task, and is consonant with the 
idea that impulsivity may be highly domain-specific (Stevens and 
Stephens, 2010), and more generally that impulsivity may not be 
a single unified phenomenon (Evenden, 1999).
Our results also imply that the learning algorithms employed 
by foraging animals may not be well-adapted to typical laboratory 
tasks designed to measure impulsivity. In particular, animals seem 
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Figure 4 | Model-averaged half-lives for both monkeys over the course of 
training. In early sessions, cued and uncued conditions were interleaved in 
blocks of several hundred trials. Following this, both monkeys received several 
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